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I.

INTRODUCTION

After World War II, the international community united to
denounce the atrocities that ravaged entire cultures during the war.
Because of these atrocities, the international community gathered
together to form the United Nations, an international organization
designed to protect future generations from the scourge of war by
preventing these horrific acts from ever again dominating the
1
international arena. The post-World War II period also witnessed
the promulgation of several international human rights laws and
treaties to further the goal of international peace.2
These
international human rights laws never fully realized their potential
during the Cold War, when international conflicts were the main
cause of global concern and ethnic uprisings were stifled by the
3
With the end of the Cold War, a
hegemonic superpowers.
1. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 92 (1993) (discussing the motivation behind the formulation of a united, international
body); see also Kimberly D. Barnes, International Law, the United Nations, and Intervention in Civil
Conflicts, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 117, 127 (1995) (stating that the events of World War
II influenced the Allied countries’ decision to formulate an international body).
2. See ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE 75 (1998) (observing that after the Nuremberg trials, many nations signed human
rights treaties that obligated them to punish those who violated human rights).
3. See PAUL HIRST, MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS: SECURITY
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geopolitical shift took place, with the threat of nuclear disaster no
4
longer pervading the consciousness of the global community. The
dawning of this new era, however, brought another threat to the
tenuous peace of the international community: the proliferation of
intrastate ethnic conflicts.5 The rise of intrastate ethnic conflict has
tested the effectiveness of both the United Nations Charter and
various international human rights laws and treaties, as well as the
resolve of the international community to protect human rights and
preserve international peace.6
This Comment examines the difficulties inherent in reconciling
international human rights laws and treaties with the current state of
world conflicts, and it will attempt to discern the reasons behind the
failure of those laws to protect persons for whom they were intended.
Part II outlines the various human rights laws and treaties, including
their historical origins, purpose, and significance. Part III discusses
the failure of these laws to prevent the recent occurrences of violent
intrastate ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and how to bring the
perpetrators of ethnic violence to justice. Part IV analyzes the
provisions of international law which prevent effective enforcement
of human rights laws.
These provisions, present throughout
international human rights documents, were drafted in such a way as
to protect the notion of sovereignty, and are evident in the numerous
CHALLENGES IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 175 (Lawrence Freedman ed., Blackwell Publishers
1994) (examining the superpowers’ role during the Cold War, where the United States and the
Soviet Union fought for control of Europe and summarily quashed any other crisis, which had
the potential of diverting them from their purpose).
4. See Barnes, supra note 1, at 117 (stating the end of the Cold War has decreased the
threat of nuclear war).
5. See NICHOLAS KITTRIE, THE WAR AGAINST AUTHORITY 1 (1995) (discussing the rise of
intrastate ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era). Professor Kittrie strongly asserts that
[w]hile sundry scholars and agencies . . . keep speculating about where the next
decade’s or era’s international arenas of conflict are likely to be, it is highly probable
that the greatest contemporary and forthcoming world crises will be domestic. The
escalating global disorder seems to derive from the internal, rather than international,
confrontations.
Id. See also Paul J. Magnarella, Preventing Interethnic Conflict and Promoting Human Rights Through
More Effective Legal, Political, and Aid Structures: Focus on Africa, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 327,
327-28 (1993) (noting that the rise of intrastate ethnic conflicts represent the greatest threats to
the global order); Nicholas Kittrie, Introductory Remarks: International Responses to Secessionist
Conflicts, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 296, 297 (1996) (observing that the end of the Cold War
has brought about the resurgence of dormant ethnic hostilities); Tom Farer, Negotiating the
Settlement of Secessionist Conflicts: International Responses to Secessionist Conflicts, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 296, 304 (1996) (commenting that the end of the Cold War has aggravated ethnic
tensions); David Wippman, Treaty—Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607,
607 (1995) (remarking on the acceleration of intrastate conflicts after the end of the Cold
War).
6. See discussion infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing the recent failures of
the international community to utilize international human rights laws in their efforts to bring
peace and justice to Yugoslavia).
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reservations to treaties currently in force. Part V recommends how
the international community should utilize the international human
rights laws and treaties to accomplish the purpose for which they
were intended, namely to deter and punish the states which violate
those norms. It also recommends methods to bring about peace in
the New World Order through more uniform implementation of the
dictates of international law.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS AND TREATIES
Throughout history, several international laws and treaties were
formulated to deal both directly and indirectly with the notion of
7
The Covenant of the League of Nations dealt
human rights.
8
expressly with human rights in Article 23; the pre-World War II
Geneva Conventions regulated the treatment of civilians;9 and the
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions (“Hague Conventions”) both
10
mandated that the lives of persons be respected. Perhaps the most
important aspect of the Hague Conventions was that they based their
normative principles on the value of the “laws of humanity,”11 a
concept which would later lead to the “crimes against humanity”
12
The atrocities
provisions of international human rights laws.
committed during World War II reinforced the need for
international instruments designed for the sole purpose of protecting

7. The first military laws that were formulated dealt indirectly with the protection of
civilian populations. See Leo Gross, The Punishment of War Criminals: The Nuremberg Trial, 2
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 356, 358 (1955) (detailing the various laws that provide for the protection
of civilians). For a general overview of these laws see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (1992) [hereinafter CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY] (noting
the historical foundations of the protections of civilians).
8. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 23 (stating that the League would regulate
labor conditions and treatment of individuals in member states’ territories).
9. See NEIER, supra note 2, at 22 (observing that the Geneva Conventions were formulated
to regulate the treatment of both civilians and combatants during war).
10. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War, 26 Martens (2d) 949,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 129 (1907) [hereinafter Hague
Convention] (providing for the protection of civilian populations during times of war). Article
46 of both Conventions states in part: “Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practices, must be respected.” Id. art. 46.
See also CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 7, at 302 (discussing the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions as providing for protection of civilian populations from deportation).
11. Hague Convention, supra note 10, pmbl., para. 9. Paragraph 9 reads in part:
“[P]opulations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.” Id.
12. See CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 7, at 165-66 (stating that the “crimes against
humanity” provisions in later human rights laws were developed by the Hague Conventions’ use
of the term “laws of humanity”).
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13
Thus, during the post-World War II period, the
human rights.
international community promulgated several international human
14
rights treaties explicitly detailing the protection of human rights.
These treaties included the United Nations Charter, the statutes of
15
the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals, and the four Geneva
16
Conventions.
The Nuremberg statute proved exceedingly
important because it transformed the nature of international
17
criminal law. The Nuremberg Tribunal stood for the proposition
that “[t]hose who authorized and committed crimes against the
peace, war crimes and humanitarian crimes would be personally
responsible for those crimes and would be made to suffer the
consequences of their conduct.”18 That premise thrust human rights
into the international spotlight and paved the way for the
promulgation of modern human rights laws.
This discussion focuses on four of human rights documents and
their relevant provisions. These documents include the United
Nations Charter (“U.N. Charter”); the Convention on the Prevention

13. See KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 231 (1997) (commenting on how the brutality of World War II finally
persuaded nations to promulgate instruments to protect civilian populations during wartime).
14. See NEIER, supra note 2, at xiii (observing that the post-World War II era’s increase in
human rights laws was a result of the atrocities of the Nazis).
15. See William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60
ALB. L. REV. 733, 737 (1997) (explaining that the post-World War II tribunals had jurisdiction
to adjudicate war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity). The Charter of
the International Military Tribunal defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288; see generally CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra
note 7 (detailing the various provisions of the Charter).
16. The 1949 Geneva Conventions include: the [Geneva] Convention (I) For the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First
Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; the [Geneva] Convention (II) For the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; the [Geneva]
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention),
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; the [Geneva] Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. See CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 7, at 134
(noting that each of these documents purported to create a system whereby international rights
would be protected).
17. See Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal
Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 127, 149 (1995)
(observing how the war crimes trials in Nuremberg decentralized the character of international
law).
18. Id. at 150.
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and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide
Convention”); the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“Declaration”) and the subsequent adoption of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Political Rights (“International Covenants”);
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Torture Convention”).
A. The United Nations Charter
1.

Historical Background

After the failure of the League of Nations, the international
community replaced it with the United Nations, but kept the goals of
19
the League as the primary thrust of this new organization. The
Allied powers felt that this was the only type of institution that would
20
eliminate the problems which led to World War II. The members of
the United Nations developed the U.N. Charter during the last weeks
of World War II as the means by which the member states could
prevent another global catastrophe.21
Its adoption in 1945
“represented an enormous advance because it legitimized
international efforts to protect human rights everywhere.”22
Given the nature of conflicts during this period, the purpose of the
U.N. Charter was to promote a more peaceful and secure global
23
community. The drafters of the Charter designed its provisions to
19. See WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 74
(1990) (examining the circumstances surrounding the formation of the League of Nations).
The establishment of The League of Nations in 1920 resulted from the memory of World War I.
Id. The hope that The League would prevent another world war was dashed as global
governments refused to give up their sovereignty in an isolationist era. Id. For a general
discussion on the League of Nations see F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1952) (describing in detail the effects of World War I, the subsequent establishment of the
League of Nations, and its ultimate failure to unite the governments of the world in a single
organization for the purpose of global peace).
20. The United Nations was formed as a result of World War II and the need to promote
the common interests of the international community. The allied forces met in 1945 in San
Francisco to draft what would become the U.N. Charter. See generally AREND & BECK, supra note
1, at 1 (detailing the 1945 meeting between the Allied powers); see also UNITED NATIONS
PUBLICATIONS, EVERYONE’S UNITED NATIONS 3 (10th ed. 1986) [hereinafter EVERYONE’S UNITED
NATIONS] (discussing the creation of the U.N. Charter at the end of World War II).
21. See EVERYONE’S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 20, at 3 (expressing the desire of the
Allied powers to create a document for the purpose of establishing binding norms on the
nations of the world).
22. NEIER, supra note 2, at 22.
23. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The United Nations Charter’s Preamble reads in part:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss3/4

6

Waller: Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and International Law: How the Rise o
WALLER.FINAL.ASC

10/7/01 7:37 PM

2001]INTRASTATE ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

627

“achieve international co-operation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
24
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights . . . .” Within
the context of the Charter’s purposes, these drafters created
25
provisions used to develop friendly relations with nations; to achieve
26
international cooperation in resolving problems; to cooperate to
attain the Charter’s goals;27 and to set up a system to control armed
28
conflicts aimed at civilian populations.
2.

Relevant Provisions of the U.N. Charter Incorporating Human
Rights

Based on the purposes behind the formation of the U.N. Charter,
the drafters attempted to internationalize the concept of human
rights for all persons. As such, the U.N. Charter provides that the
“United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”29 To ensure
that this provision is carried out, the Charter maintains that all
United Nations’ members work in conjunction with the international
community to achieve the goals set out in Article 5530 and provide for
the expulsion of any member state found to be in violation of the
31
Charter’s principles. Article 1, paragraph 2 further states that there
is to be respect for the principle of “equal rights and self32
determination.”
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . . .
U.N. CHARTER pmbl. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1 (outlining the Charter’s main
purpose of maintaining international peace and security); Barnes, supra note 1, at 127-29
(describing the purposes of the U.N. Charter regarding its international character).
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
25. See id. art. 1, para. 2.
26. See id. art. 1, para. 3.
27. See id. art. 1, para. 4 (stating that in order to maintain international peace and security,
the member states must respect the equal rights and self-determination of peoples and work
together to achieve common goals).
28. See ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 5 (1993)
(stating that the Charter was designed to prevent the atrocities of World War II).
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
30. See id. art. 56 (dictating that all member states shall work together to promote the
purposes of Article 55, including economic and social progress and creating solutions to
economic and social problems).
31. See id. art. 6 (detailing the expulsion of a member which is contingent upon a
recommendation by the Security Council).
32. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
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Chapter VII of the Charter addresses actions taken with respect to
threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.33 This
Chapter authorizes the Security Council to take various measures,
including non-force and armed force measures, which it deems
appropriate to maintain peace.34 This aspect of the Charter has
proven extremely important in recent years with the rise of
humanitarian intervention,35 where ethnic violence has reached
36
catastrophic levels. Commentators argue that Chapter VII should
be utilized by the United Nations in authorizing humanitarian
assistance to victims of ethnic violence,37 given the nature of conflicts
38
today.

B. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide39
1.

Historical Origins, Purpose, and Significance of the Convention

The Genocide Convention resulted from the horrors of World War
II and from an eagerness on the part of the international
40

33. See id. Ch. VII, arts. 39-51 (summarizing the enforcement actions that may be taken by
the Security Council).
34. See id. Ch. VII, art. 39 (proclaiming the Security Council’s power to decide which
measures shall be taken when a threat to the peace exists).
35. Although humanitarian intervention is not explicitly authorized under the Charter,
some scholars have argued that since the United Nations has been unable to effectively protect
human rights, such intervention is warranted. See generally FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 1 (1997) (discussing the legal aspects of
humanitarian intervention); see also discussion infra Part IV.C.1 and accompanying notes
(discussing the current view on humanitarian intervention). But see Thomas M. Franck & Nigel
S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT’L
L. 275, 300-01 (1973) (arguing that unilateral humanitarian intervention violates international
law).
36. See Nagan, supra note 17, at 128 (stating that the number of persons killed by their own
governments in ethnic conflicts is approximately 170,000,000); see also R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY
GOVERNMENT 9 (1994) (finding that sovereign governments have murdered over 100 million of
their own citizens).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 701 (1987) (calling for the
legitimization of intervention to protect human rights).
38. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1 and accompanying notes (detailing the arguments for
and against humanitarian intervention under the United Nations’ Chapter VII enforcement
powers).
39. Genocide, for the purposes of the Genocide Convention and this Comment, is defined
as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group . . . .” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
40. See Nicole M. Procida, Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, A Case Study: Employing
United Nations Mechanisms to Enforce the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
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community to create an instrument that would hold perpetrators of
41
such violence accountable for their actions. After the affirmation by
the United Nations General Assembly that the Nuremberg principles
existed in international law,42 the international community drafted
the Genocide Convention in an attempt to garner international
cooperation to punish those states and individuals who violate the
Nuremberg principle regarding genocide.43 The overall purpose of
the Genocide Convention is to protect religious, national, racial, and
ethnic groups from harm from both government officials and private
citizens.44 Additionally it provides for individual criminal
45
responsibility for violations of the provisions therein.
2. Relevant Provisions of the Genocide Convention With Respect to
Human Rights
Given the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II,
the international community thought it was imperative for the United
Nations to formulate a document that would garner international
46
cooperation to provide for the protection of human rights.
Genocide, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 655, 666 (1995) (noting that the Genocide
Convention resulted from the atrocities that occurred during World War II).
41. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, pmbl. (recognizing that genocide is a crime
under international law). The drafters’ concern with genocide is evident in the preamble,
which states in part: “[r]ecognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great
losses on humanity; and [b]eing convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an
odious scourge, international co-operation is required . . . .” Id. See also Raphael Lemkin,
Genocide As a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 150 (1947) (defining the
concept of genocide and describing the obligation of states to prevent such occurrences),
Procida, supra note 40, at 666-67 (detailing the origins of the Genocide Convention after World
War II and the United Nation’s role in drafting the Convention).
42. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/236 (1947)
(affirming the Nuremberg principles as a part of international criminal law); see also Oscar
Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (1986)
(noting that in 1946, the Nuremberg principles were affirmed as existing in international law by
the United Nations General Assembly).
43. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, arts. 2, 4 (defining genocide as an act
designed to destroy “national, ethnical, racial or religious group[s]” and providing for
punishment of both leaders and individuals). Article 1 provides that: “The Contracting Parties
confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” Id. art. 1. See also CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 7, at 433 (observing that after the 1946 United Nations’
resolution, the United Nations prepared the Genocide Convention).
44. Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 2 (proclaiming that these groups are to be
protected from genocide).
45. Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 4 (providing for the punishment of those
responsible for genocidal acts).
46. See Dieter Kastrup, From Nuremberg to Rome and Beyond: The Fight Against Genocide, War
Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 404, 405 (1999) (stating that the
intention of the signatories in creating the Genocide Convention was to avoid such atrocities
from occurring in the future).
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Although the Genocide Convention codified the principle of
47
genocide as a crime under international law, the Convention
provided contracting parties with leave to implement national laws
giving effect to the provisions of the Convention.48 The Genocide
Convention further provided for criminal trials for persons charged
49
with genocide and extradition for persons found to have committed
genocide in the territory of another contracting party.50 The
Genocide Convention also made genocide a specific intent crime, the
elements of which include the intent to kill or physically destroy
members of a group or cause serious bodily injury or mental harm to
them, as well as preventing births or forcibly removing children from
a group.51 Aggressors’ use of genocide as a tool of war is punishable
under Article 6 of the Genocide Convention.52
Additionally, the Genocide Convention delineates the means by
which the international community can enforce compliance with its
mandates. The Convention allows for the establishment of an
53
international tribunal to adjudicate and punish violators; authorizes
the United Nations to take action where warranted and appropriate;54
and gives the International Court of Justice the jurisdiction to resolve
disputes regarding any provision of the Genocide Convention.55
The Genocide Convention is significant in that, at its inception, it
was a definitive representation of the will and desires of governments
56
around the world to prevent another holocaust from occurring. Its
47. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 1 (confirming that genocide is a crime
under international law).
48. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 5 (providing that the contracting parties
will enact “in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give
effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective
penalties for persons guilty of genocide . . . .”). This was thought necessary in order to garner
support for the Convention domestically.
49. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 6 (asserting that such a person shall be
tried in the territory where the act was committed, or by an international tribunal).
50. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 7 (declaring the responsibility of member
states to extradite the perpetrators of genocide in accordance with domestic laws).
51. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 2 (defining the acts which constitute
genocidal aggression).
52. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 6 (providing for the prosecution of
individuals responsible for genocidal actions).
53. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 6 (giving the tribunal jurisdiction to try
individuals indicted for genocidal actions).
54. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 8 (establishing the right of a member
state to call upon the United Nations to take action under the United Nations Charter).
55. See Genocide Convention, supra note 39, art. 9 (authorizing disputants to submit
requests for clarification of the Convention to the International Court of Justice); Procida, supra
note 40, at 668-69 (discussing the jurisdictional aspects of the Genocide Convention).
56. See Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 417, 424
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provisions seek not only to prevent genocidal atrocities, but also to
act as a deterrent to states and individuals who seek to destroy certain
57
Under the Genocide Convention, compliance with the
groups.
dictates of human morality was guaranteed by the threat of
punishment from the international community as a whole.
C. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1.

The Historical Significance

The United Nations wanted to create a system whereby the value of
human rights was recognized by member states as an important
58
aspect of international law. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was drafted for this purpose and its adoption created an
59
Prior to the creation of the United
international bill of rights.
Nations and subsequent adoption of the U.N. Charter, an individual’s
60
only recourse for violations of human rights laws was under his/her
61
own domestic laws. The Declaration established the first of many
United Nations Resolutions outlining its determination to formulate
comprehensive guidelines on the handling of human rights issues
and to promote respect for human rights.62 The United Nations
(1999) (detailing the desires of the Allied forces to create an instrument codifying the
principles of the Nuremberg Charter to allow for punishment of crimes against humanity).
57. See id. (stating that the Genocide Convention allows an international criminal tribunal
to try suspected perpetrators of genocidal aggressions).
58. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810, pmbl. (1948) [hereinafter Declaration of Human Rights] (advocating respect
for human rights). The preamble goes on further to state that the Declaration is
[A] common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of
Member States themselves and among peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Id.
59. See SLOMANSON, supra note 19, at 372 (noting that the United Nations began drafting
numerous human rights treaties designed to create an international bill of rights to fulfill its
human rights goals).
60. For the purposes of this Comment, the pronoun “his” represents both masculine and
feminine connotations.
61. See SLOMANSON, supra note 19, at 372 (commenting on how the international bill of
rights guaranteed a forum for individuals seeking recourse for violations of their rights).
62. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, pmbl. (advocating a comprehensive
system for the protection of human rights). The protection of human rights was essential, in
the member states’ view, to prevent another holocaust. Id. This view was set forth in the
preamble which states in relevant part: “Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy . . . freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people . . . .” Id.
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General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), regarding the Declaration,
63
was formally adopted without dissent on December 10, 1948. The
importance of the Declaration is twofold. First, the Declaration
asserted freedom and equality for everyone, stating that “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”64 Second, it
contains two important human rights provisions expounding on the
principles of freedom and equality.65
2. Relevant Human Right Provisions of the Declaration and Their
Significance in International Law
The first provision of the Declaration deals with “civil and political
rights,” including the rights to life, liberty, and security;66 the right to
travel freely;67 freedom from slavery;68 discrimination;69 arbitrary
arrest;70 freedom to marry71 and practice one’s own religion without
72
interference. The second provision which guarantees “economic,
social, and cultural rights” outlines the right to own property,73 to
work,74 and to receive an education.75 Although these provisions were
76
originally designed to constitute a statement of principles, they are
63. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, at introduction (noting that the five
members representing the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa all abstained from
voting).
64. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 1.
65. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, pmbl. (reiterating the member states’
belief in the fundamental freedom and inherent equal rights of all human beings).
66. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 3 (proclaiming that “everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person”).
67. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 13 (confirming that every person
has the right to “freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state,” and the
right to leave and return to one’s own country).
68. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 4 (declaring that slavery and slave
trade are prohibited).
69. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 7 (asserting that all persons are
equal and are therefore entitled to equal protection without discrimination).
70. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 9 (maintaining that no person will
be forced into detention or exile, nor subject to arbitrary arrest).
71. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 16 (detailing the rights of persons
to marry with the consent of both parties, and the protection of the family by the state).
72. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 18 (affirming freedom of thought
and religion and the right to practice one’s religion in any manner deemed fit).
73. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 17 (detailing the right to own
property and not to be arbitrarily deprived of such property).
74. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 23 (declaring that consistent with
the right to work, persons are entitled to equal and adequate pay for their services).
75. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 26 (confirming the principle that
everyone is entitled to a free education at the elementary level).
76. In 1948, Eleanor Roosevelt, as U.S. Representative to the United Nations General
Assembly, stated that the Declaration was only meant as a declaration of basic human rights
principles and was not to be construed as a statement of legal obligation. See MARJORIE MILLACE
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now seen by some legal scholars and judges as binding under
77
international law.
These provisions led to the promulgation of two multilateral
78
treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights79 which, together with the Universal Declaration of Human
80
Rights, create an international bill of rights.
In 1966, as a corollary to the Declaration,81 the United Nations
General Assembly drafted the International Covenants. These
Covenants were important because they were drafted as a multilateral
treaty, thereby obligating the signatory states to adopt mechanisms of
enforcement.82 The Covenants included an obligation by states to
adopt legislation to enforce the provisions of the Covenants;83 to
provide effective remedies for violations of the provisions;84 and to
85
ensure enforcement of those remedies when granted. Since both
International Covenants share many of the same substantive
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1965) (explaining the understanding of the
signatories that the Declaration of Human Rights was to be viewed as a goal rather than a
statement of law).
77. See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.C.J. 3, at 55 (1970) (Ammoun concurrence). His opinion reads in part: “[a]lthough
the affirmations [are not possessed of the capacity of an immediately binding] international
convention . . . they can bind states on the basis of custom . . . because they have acquired the
force of custom through a general practice [of states] accepted [by them] as law . . . .” Id. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 701 (1987) (declaring that the
parties to the United Nations Charter are legally obligated by the Declaration).
78. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966), reprinted in 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
79. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 21,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights].
80. See ASKIN, supra note 13, at 231 (declaring that the Covenants and the Declaration of
Human Rights create an International Bill of Rights).
81. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 78, pmbl. (proclaiming its
congruence with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Covenant on Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 79, pmbl. (stating that the Covenant is in accord with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
82. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 78, art. 2, paras. 1-3 (detailing the
mechanisms signatory states undertake to adopt to ensure the rights enumerated in the
Covenant); see also SLOMANSON, supra note 19, at 392 (listing the obligations signatory states
have in adopting legislation to enforce the provisions of the Covenants).
83. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 78, art. 2, para. 2 (declaring that
member states undertake, within their own constitutional processes, to adopt domestic
legislation giving effect to the Convention).
84. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 78, art. 2, para. 3(1) (maintaining
that such remedies shall be determined by “competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities . . . .”).
85. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 78, art. 2, para. 3(2) (ensuring
that the authorities within each state will enforce the remedies granted).
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principles outlined in the Declaration, the principles outlined in the
Declaration now have the force of law with regards to those states
86
ratifying the Covenants.
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for the
creation of a Human Rights Committee, whose purpose is to monitor
87
compliance with human rights laws. The Committee is authorized
to receive complaints detailing human rights violations from both
88
state parties and, under the Optional Protocol, from individuals.
D. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
1.

Historical Aspects of the Torture Convention

The Torture Convention89 represents the desire of the
international community to further incorporate human rights into
international law by adopting an instrument designed to prevent
specific types of activities used against civilian populations.90 Utilizing
91
the principles announced in the U.N. Charter and the Declaration,
86. See David Wippman, Hearing Voices Within the State: Internal Conflicts and the Claims of
Ethno-National Groups, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 585, 587 (1995) (stating that individual rights
are recognized in international law).
87. See Scott Splittgerber, The Need for Greater Regional Protection for the Human Rights of
Women: The Cases of Rape in Bosnia and Guatemala, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 185, 189 (1996) (outlining
the various provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provide for a human
rights monitoring body).
88. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (authorizing the Commission to
receive complaints from individuals); see also Splittberger, supra note 87, at 189 (outlining who
can bring complaints regarding human rights violations).
89. Torture, for the purposes of the Torture Convention is defined as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining . . . a confession, punishing him
for an act he . . . has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him . . . or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent . . . of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708, art. 1
(1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
90. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, pmbl. The desires of the United Nations
General Assembly are expressed in part in the preamble which states that there is a need “to
make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment throughout the world . . . .” Id.
91. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, pmbl. (declaring its intentions to expound the
principles outlined in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights). The authors took particular notice of Article 55 in the United Nations Charter, which
provides for the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the
Declaration’s provisions in Article 5 relating to torture and cruel treatment or punishment. See
U.N. Charter art. 55 (outlining the United Nations’ belief in the promotion of human rights
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the parties to this Convention created a binding obligation on states
to adopt the necessary measures to prevent torturous conduct by
92
individuals towards its population.
2.

Important Provisions of the Torture Convention

The Torture Convention enumerates several provisions that
protect the rights of individuals residing in the jurisdiction of parties
93
to the Convention. One of the obligations imposed on signatory
states is the provision that torture is not to be used under any
circumstances and includes the penalties to be assessed for the
violation thereof.94 Article 2, paragraph 3 provides that: “[n]o
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether in a state of war or
threat o[f] war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”95
The Torture Convention also provides for redress and
96
compensation for an individual subjected to torture. It also makes
97
Furthermore, the Convention
torture an extraditable offense.
establishes a Committee against Torture,98 which reviews the reports
submitted by member states to evaluate measures taken towards
99
compliance with the Torture Convention. If there is a finding of
torture within a particular state party, the Committee invites the state
to cooperate in any investigations,100 and a report is then submitted to
and fundamental freedoms); see also Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, art. 5
(providing that no person may be subjected to torture).
92. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 2, para. 1 (obligating states to effect proper
legislative, administrative, judicial, and other measures to prevent acts of torture).
93. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 2, para. 1 (providing that member states
undertake to prevent torture in any territory under their jurisdiction).
94. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 4, para. 1 (ensuring that torture is
punishable under a state’s criminal law).
95. Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 2, para. 3. Article 2, paragraph 4 further
provides that a superior order may not be invoked as a defense or justification to torture an
individual. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
96. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 14, para. 1 (declaring that every member
state shall ensure that its legal system is capable of sufficiently redressing acts of torture
committed against an individual and providing adequate compensation).
97. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 8, para. 1 (providing that the perpetrator of
acts of torture is subject to extradition).
98. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 17, paras. 1-7 (outlining the formulation of
the Committee and how its members are elected).
99. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 19, paras. 1-4 (describing the process
through which reports are submitted to the Committee).
100. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 20, paras. 1-5 (detailing how the Committee
deals with reports of torture within a member state). Once reports have been gathered
detailing torturous practices in a member state, the Committee shall invite that state to
cooperate in the investigation. Id. para. 1. The Committee may then designate a member to
make a confidential inquiry, including a visit to the territory in question. Id. art. 20, paras. 2-3.
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101

the Secretary General of the United Nations.
World War II was the catalyst that brought the governments of the
world together in the hopes of creating a more peaceful coexistence
through the creation of human rights laws. These documents
represent a rise in global awareness of the importance of human
rights. They also represent the collective effort of the international
community in formulating an international system of rights,
recognized as the guiding principles for states in dealing with their
populations. Despite the success in creating these new human rights
laws, they have only served to highlight the deficiencies in the system
regarding enforcement of the human rights treaties and laws under
the international legal system. The rise of intrastate ethnic conflicts
has only increased the cognizance of states as to the failures and
consequences of non-enforcement.
III. THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS
A. The Case of Yugoslavia
The war in the former Yugoslavia began as a result of the desires of
102
This desire manifested itself because of
the republics to secede.
Serbia’s continued policy of repression of the Albanians in Kosovo—a
policy condemned by the other republics and the international
community as a whole,103 and the Serbs’ attempted takeover of the
League of Communists party (“LCY”).104 The controversy over
Kosovo and the LCY precipitated the walkout of the Slovenian,
Croatian, Bosnian, and Macedonian delegations from the Yugoslav
Congress, and their subsequent elections and referendums for

After the proceedings have been completed, the Committee may decide to include an account
of the results in its annual report. Id. art. 20, para. 5.
101. See Torture Convention, supra note 89, art. 21 (outlining the jurisdictional aspects of
the Committee with regard to member states).
102. See LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION 147 (1996)
(discussing the resentment of the various republics with Milosevic’s regime and their desire for
independence).
103. See BOGDAN DENITCH, ETHNIC NATIONALISM: THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA 22
(1994) (stating that the “rest of the federation became unwilling to use its resources and
prestige in pursuing a policy that was increasingly condemned internationally”); see also Warren
Zimmerman, The Last Ambassador, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 2 (commenting on
Serbia’s treatment of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo). Zimmerman goes on further to state that
“human rights had become a major element of U.S. Policy, and Yugoslavia’s record on that
issue was not good—particularly in the province of Kosovo, where an authoritarian Serbian
regime was systematically depriving the Albanian majority of its basic civil liberties.” Id.
104. See DENITCH, supra note 103, at 56-58 (detailing the importance of control over the
party and the Serb’s attempted takeover of it).
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105
independence. In 1990, both Croatia and Slovenia held their first
free elections, in which the parties played to the growing nationalist
sentiments of their populations.
Croatia in particular took
nationalism to new heights by employing emblems used by the Nazi
106
aligned Ustaše during World War II, inciting fear and anger in the
Serb minority living in Croatia. The parties campaigning on
secessionist platforms won handily, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia
seemed imminent.
During this time, the international community began to take
measures designed to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia. In 1991,
the European Union107 Council of Ministers convened a conference
in an attempt to keep Yugoslavia united.108 When this failed, the
European Union used economic deterrence in the concurrent aims
of keeping the republics from claiming independence and
preventing the Serbian government from using military force to
109
enforce unity. The European Union also threatened denial of EC
membership if the Yugoslav state dissolved.110 Ultimately, the actions
taken by the international community failed to keep Yugoslavia
unified, and with the recognition of Croatia, Slovenia and BosniaHerzegovina as independent republics, the squirmishes which that
took place in late 1991 through early 1992 turned into an all out
war.111
In an attempt to protect its minority populations in the various

105. See DENITCH, supra note 103, at 22, 42-45 (outlining the progression from the original
walkout from Congress by the various republics to the subsequent elections calling for
secession).
106. The Ustaše were Croats who aligned themselves with the Nazis during World War II.
Some of the worst atrocities of World War II took place at the notorious concentration camp
Jasenovac, located in Croatia, where it is estimated that between one hundred thousand to one
million Serbs, Jews and Gypsies were murdered. See DENITCH, supra note 103, at 20-32
(remarking on the Ustaše’s role in the atrocities of World War II).
107. At the start of the Yugoslav crisis, the European Union was known as the European
Community. For the sake of continuity, this Comment will refer to the unified European states
as the European Union.
108. See Paul Szasz, Theme Panel II: The Rise of Nationalism and the Breakup of States—The
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 33, 34 (1994) (summarizing the
European Union’s efforts to keep Yugoslavia unified by convening a conference for that
purpose). The Conference formulated a plan whereby some republics would function
independently of Yugoslavia and others would remain “more closely associated.” Id. This plan
would keep Yugoslavia united, but in a somewhat different fashion. Id.
109. See SAADIA TOUVAL, MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: LESSONS OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN
YUGOSLAVIA 404, 404-05 (Chester Crocker et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the tools utilized by the
European Union to keep Yugoslavia together).
110. See MICHAEL S. LUND, PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICTS: A STRATEGY FOR PREVENTIVE
DIPLOMACY 61 (1997) (examining the various ways the European Union sought to prevent
dissolutionment).
111. See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 102, at 169 (noting the beginning of the Yugoslav war).
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republics and to retain its hold over various portions of land, the
112
Serbian government began its assault, first in Slovenia and Croatia
and then in Bosnia. The war that ensued in Bosnia “generated grave
breaches of the main precepts of humanitarian law,”113 and the
international community sought to prevent further breaches of its
114
international human rights laws.
1. Violations of Human Rights Under the Rubric of Ethnic Cleansing
During the war, both the Croatian and Serbian armies utilized
115
torture, rape, ethnic cleansing, and genocide as a means of war, in
direct contravention of their obligations under the various human
116
These human rights violations were
rights laws and treaties.
observed by various organizations, including the International
Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and the United
Nations Human Rights Commission.117
It was through these
organizations that the world would soon learn of the horrors of the
Yugoslav war.
a. Torture
The parties to the Bosnian conflict instituted a plan of systematic
torture of civilian populations in Yugoslavia, in direct contravention
118
Detention
of their obligations under the Torture Convention.
centers were set up as a means of degrading and punishing persons
of certain ethnic heritage.119 This was accomplished through a variety
of means, including beating prisoners with iron bars, rifles, hammers,
and wooden clubs, and forcing prisoners to drink motor oil and
mud.120 One of the most horrific acts of torture occurred in the
112. See Nagan, supra note 17, at 153 (noting that the Yugoslav war began with the attack of
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991).
113. Nagan, supra note 17, at 154.
114. See discussion infra Part IV.C and accompanying notes (describing the actions of the
United Nations, the European Union, and the United States in trying to prevent further
atrocities).
115. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L.J. 59,
86 (1993) (describing the use of torture, death camps, genocide, and rape as strategies of war).
116. See discussion supra Part II and accompanying notes (describing the various obligations
of United Nations member states under both the U.N. Charter and other international human
rights documents).
117. See NEIER, supra note 2, at 124 (noting the monitoring operations led by numerous
human rights organizations in Yugoslavia).
118. See discussion supra Part II.D and accompanying notes (describing the definition of
torture and the provisions of the Torture Convention).
119. See NEIER, supra note 2, at 134 (describing the proliferation of detention centers
reminiscent of the concentration camps used by the Nazis in World War II).
120. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
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Omarska death camp, when the Serb jailers forced one of the
121
Croatian forces also
prisoners to bite off the testicles of another.
established a detention center in the city of Pakracka Poljana, near
Zagreb, where Serbian civilians were regularly tortured, usually by
being doused with gasoline and burned alive.122 The constant use of
torture and detention gravely breached both the Torture
Convention123 and the Fourth Geneva Convention.124 The violators
are therefore subject to prosecution as provided for in those
instruments. However, these remedies were not pursued by the
international community.125
b. Rape
The Geneva Convention and other human rights documents
126
recognize rape as a crime against humanity. The act of rape as seen
during the Yugoslav war was also a form of genocide, orchestrated by
the combatants to not only humiliate and degrade, but to impregnate
in order to destroy ethnicity.127 During the war, international human
rights organizations learned that rape was occurring on a regular
128
Serb armies in
basis by factions on all sides as a weapon of war.
particular regularly used rape as a strategy of war, both as an attempt

WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG XI (1997) [hereinafter BALKAN JUSTICE] (detailing some
of the means used to torture inmates in the Omarska death camp).
121. See id. (summarizing some of the torture tactics of Serbian jailers towards their Muslim
prisoners).
122. See NEIER, supra note 2, at 148 (explaining the use of torture tactics by Croatian forces
in various detention centers).
123. See discussion supra Part II.D.1-2 and accompanying notes (discussing the provisions of
the Torture Convention).
124. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 16, art. 147 (stating that the unlawful
confinement of a protected person is a grave breach of the Convention). The Convention
defines a protected person as a “noncombatant who has fallen into the hands of a party to the
conflict or an occupying power and who has not been detained as a spy or saboteur or on
suspicion of engaging in activities hostile to the occupying power.” NEIER, supra note 2, at 138.
125. See discussion infra Part IV (describing the reluctance of the international community
to use the provisions of its own human rights laws as a means for bringing justice to the victims).
126. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 16, art. 27 (“[w]omen shall be especially
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution,
or any form of indecent assault.”).
127. See ASKIN, supra note 13, at 274 (detailing how rape in order to impregnate women is
used as genocide). Because these acts are designed with the intent to destroy certain ethnic,
racial or religious groups, they fall under the definition of genocide as codified in the Genocide
Convention. Id. at 275; see also Nagan, supra note 17, at 164 (commenting on how rape, when
systematically employed as a means of war, can be seen as genocide).
128. See ASKIN, supra note 13, at 282 (commenting on the rape camps run by Bosnian and
Croatian forces for the purpose of raping Serbian women); see generally Stephen Schwartz, Rape
as a Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 69, 69 (1994) (detailing
how the warring parties used rape in their arsenal of war tactics).
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to ethnically cleanse certain areas, and to assert Serb domination.
Bosnian Muslim women were often taken to warehouses and raped
repeatedly.130
c. Genocide
Although genocide was committed by all sides, the Serbs
pervasively used genocide as a tool of war. Serbs consistently killed,
imprisoned or forcibly transferred over ninety percent of Muslims
131
Those Bosnian Muslims not killed or forcibly
living in Bosnia.
transferred were taken to Serb run death camps and were starved,
summarily executed, or beaten to death.132 On certain occasions as
133
many as 7,000 Muslims were executed within a five-day period. The
Genocide Convention specifically prohibits the use of genocide as a
tool of war, and the perpetrators of genocidal aggressions are subject
to the provisions of that Convention.134
The international community was unable to stop the proliferation
of atrocities in Yugoslavia despite the numerous international human
rights treaties specifically designed to prevent such horrors.
Ironically, after World War II, the international community promised
itself and its population that the devastation of that war would never
135
again pervade any sector of the world. The violence that took place
in Yugoslavia undermined that promise as thousands were killed in
the name of ethnic homogeneity. The international community is
replete with an arsenal of laws designed to protect the very people
killed in the Yugoslav conflict.
In order to understand the
129. See Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the
Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 801-02
(1997) (detailing the Serb’s use of rape as a strategy of war). The Serb army regularly raped
women in public in order to force Croatian and Bosnian populations to flee, effectively
cleansing those areas. Id.
130. See MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 208 (1992)
(describing the pervasive use of rape utilized by the Serbs for the purposes of territorial gain
and psychological abuse).
131. See BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 29 (detailing the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim
populations in the Serb run sections of Bosnia).
132. See NEIER, supra note 2, at 136 (describing the execution techniques utilized by Serb
soldiers).
133. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: Srebenica
Report, U.N. GAOR 5th Comm., 72d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/35 (1998) (detailing the
massacres of thousands of unarmed boys and men by Serb forces).
134. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-2 and accompanying notes (describing the various
human rights documents that prohibit specific war crimes and the punishment for violations of
their provisions).
135. See Martha Minow, The Work of Remembering: After Genocide and Mass Atrocity, 23
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 429, 429 (1999) (stating that after World War II, the international
community swore that such a tragedy would never occur again).
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catastrophic failure of the international community to prevent these
ethnic massacres, it is necessary to delve into the contributing factors
behind the failures.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY, NON-INTERVENTION, RESERVATIONS AND
GEOPOLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES: THE FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS
The tragedy in Yugoslavia brought the failures of international
human rights laws into the public realm. Although efforts were made
by various actors and organizations to bring about a peaceful
resolution to the conflict, they were largely unsuccessful as the
136
atrocities taking place reached a crescendo. With the proliferation
of human rights laws, the devastation of ethnic cleansing seemed an
impossibility in the world today.
Despite the international
community’s goal of alleviating human suffering through the
137
implementation of human rights laws, these laws are often seen as
just that, goals, rather than enforceable norms of our international
society.138 The problems inherent in our system of international law
are most evident in the context of the Yugoslav war, where the rules
regarding the treatment of human beings, as codified by the
international community as a whole, were largely disregarded.139
Although enforcement mechanisms were implemented for such
violations, the international community failed to utilize them in their
136. See JAMES GOW, MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS—NERVOUS BUNNIES:
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE YUGOSLAV WAR OF DISSOLUTION, THE POLITICS OF
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN A TIME OF CHANGE 14 (Lawrence Freedman ed., Blackwell Publishers
1994) (commenting on the fact that although efforts were taken by the international
community to stop the atrocities, these ultimately failed).
137. See John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy,
39 VA. J. INT’L L. 881, 882 (1999) (“Subsequent to the Holocaust, with increasing urgency and
impetus, international law has also developed an impressive body of rules and principles to
control the behavior of governments toward their own peoples.”).
138. See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J.
1397, 1401 (1999) (detailing the explanations regarding how nations perceive international
human rights laws and why they obey its dictates). Koh details five theories to explain why
certain nations obey international law, including power, self interest, rule legitimacy,
communitarian, and legal process explanations. Id. The first explanation is that nations do not
obey international law but are forced to comply by other nations. Id. The second explanation
is that nations obey because they are motivated by their own self-interest to comply with
international law because of their dealings with other states. Id. Nations may also comply
because the rules announced in international law are legitimate ones, consistent with a state’s
own notion of “distributive justice.” Id. at 1403. The communitarian theory draws its source
from the international community itself, where nations are drawn together by their ties to
various organizations. Id. at 1405. The last theory regarding international legal process, which
Koh adopts, is based upon both the horizontal relationships between governments and the
vertical relationships between governments and their domestic citizenry. Id. at 1406.
139. See discussion supra Part III (detailing the various abuses and violations of international
human rights laws evidenced by the parties to the Yugoslav war).
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attempts to end the war. Despite the numerous reasons for this
failure, this Comment will focus on three key reasons in an attempt to
discern the motivations behind the actions taken by the international
community. These include (1) the principle of sovereignty, (2) nonintervention in international law and (3) geopolitical timing.
A. Sovereignty as a Bar to Enforcement of International Human Rights Laws
1.

The Historical Prominence of the Principle of Sovereignty

140
The principle of sovereignty is synonomous with international
141
Historically international law was designed to preserve the
law.
autonomy of states within the international arena.142 Sovereignty thus
served the purpose of “identif[ying] the nation-state as the legitimate
143
international actor entitled to the protection of international law,”
and traditionally protected the rights of states in the conduct of their
144
own affairs. Hence, the principle of sovereignty was often viewed by
states as one of their most fundamental, if not absolute, rights.145 This
view of sovereignty began to erode as humanitarian concerns took
146
center stage and was dealt a devastating blow in the aftermath of

140. For the purposes of this Comment, under the principle of sovereignty, “the exercise of
jurisdiction by one state over matters and parties within the territorial limits of another
independent state,” is forbidden. Patricia McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the
Principle of Sovereignty Against the Demands for International Justice, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 535, 535-36 (1997).
141. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and
International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 321, 327 (1991) (describing the evolution of the
concept of sovereignty from the 16th century through the present day). van der Vyver describes
two theories commonly utilized in discussing sovereignty. Id. The first deals with the absolutist
concept of sovereignty where the sovereign was identified as the supreme power and the
populace was seen as being under the sovereign’s complete control. Id. at 327-31. The second
theory is that of popular sovereignty where the citizenry are largely in control of the governance
of their state. Id. at 332. This theory is derived from the doctrine of natural rights as
enunciated by John Locke. Id. See also Bodley, supra note 56, at 420-22 (observing that the
concept of absolute sovereignty was merely a fiction, especially since the advent of the World
Wars).
142. See David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL.
L. REV. 253, 259-60 (1992) (providing the historical background of the concept of sovereignty
in the formation of international law).
143. Id. at 260.
144. Ravi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the Principle of Nonintervention With the Right of
Humanitarian Intervention, 1 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221, 222 (1996) (describing the
traditional positivist theory of international law that states are the “primary subjects of
international law”). This theory suggests that because states represent the interests of their
populations, human beings do not have a voice in international law. Id.
145. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a PeopleCentered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (1993) (discussing how the
concept of sovereignty pervades international law); see also McKeon, supra note 140, at 536
(explaining the pervasive feelings that states have towards their perceived right to sovereignty).
146. See discussion supra Part II (detailing the various documents which purported to create
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World War II.
2.

The Changing Face of Sovereignty after World War II

The horrific occurrences of World War II brought about the
institution of a war crimes tribunal for the prosecution of those
147
responsible for the atrocities. The Nuremberg Tribunal is credited
with piercing the notion of sovereignty by allowing for the
prosecution of individuals responsible for criminal acts.148
“Nuremberg made the sovereign state and its officials subject to the
international rule of law.”149 This was important in two respects.
First, the Nuremberg decision cast doubt upon the notion that the
purpose of international law was to protect the interests of nationstates.150 By rejecting the claim of sovereignty as a defense for those
charged with war crimes, the Nuremberg Tribunal paved the way for
the punishment of those responsible for atrocities including not only
individuals, but also the sovereign state itself.151 The effect of this
decision was to redistribute power away from the sovereign state and
to the international community for the purpose of punishing
criminality.152
The Nuremberg trials became the catalyst that changed the face of
153
Nuremberg’s denial of sovereignty as
international law.
protections for civilian populations during times of war).
147. See Rocco P. Cervoni, Beating Plowshares into Swords—Reconciling the Sovereign Right to SelfDetermination with Individual Human Rights Through An International Criminal Court: The Lessons of
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a Frontpiece, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 477, 499
(1997) (examining the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal); see also Bodley, supra note 56, at 424 (summarizing the
agreement between the Allied powers to establish a Tribunal for the purpose of trying war
criminals). Because of the devastation wrought by both the Nazi and Japanese governments,
the Allies sought a means by which war criminals could be brought to justice. Id. The Allies
first established a War Crimes Commission to investigate war crimes and their perpetrators. Id.
They then issued the Moscow Declaration stating that both political and military leaders would
be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Id. The Allies then determined that an
international tribunal was the most effective means by which to accomplish their objectives, and
in 1945, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was formally instituted. Id.
148. See Henry T. King, Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 135, 136-37
(1996) (discussing the importance of the Nuremberg Tribunal in penetrating the curtain of
sovereignty); see also McKeon, supra note 140, at 537 (describing the Tribunal’s decision
“reject[ing] the argument that state sovereignty could be used as a defense for unconscionable
acts”).
149. Nagan, supra note 17, at 150.
150. See Nagan, supra note 17, at 150 (discussing how Nuremberg changed the conception
that international law was for protection of the sovereignty of states).
151. See Nagan, supra note 17, at 150 (summarizing the effects of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s
decision to reject a sovereignty defense).
152. See Nagan, supra note 17, at 152 (analyzing the reallocation of power to the
international community).
153. See Bodley, supra note 56, at 424 (detailing some of the changes which took place in
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authorization for perpetrating heinous acts against one’s own
population, displaced the deep rooted notions regarding the status of
154
states and their rights and obligations under international law. The
prevalence of humanitarian concerns after World War II, manifested
in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s decision, replaced the normative
definition of sovereignty with a more humanistic view of the
obligations of international law.
However innovative and
unprecedented the decision was in terms of the global consequence
as to the future of sovereignty, it has remained merely a judicial
mandate as to the treatment of sovereignty within the jurisdiction of a
court system. In recent years, this has been increasingly evident in
the context of intervention, where the absolute sovereignty doctrine
has continued to play a large role in the conduct of the international
community.
The salient blow to sovereignty discerned at Nuremberg has failed
to manifest itself in states’ dealings with each other, and only
155
undermined sovereignty within the confines of judicial decisions.
The Tribunal’s rejection of the ancient view of sovereignty has
ultimately failed to bring about a consensus as to the future viability
156
The
of the concept, despite protestations indicating otherwise.
archaic notion of sovereignty as the basis of the international legal
157
order is perceptible throughout the international community and
international law after the Nuremberg trials). Some of the changes included the affirmation of
the principles of the Nuremberg Charter into international law, the adoption of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the creation of
an international body for the purpose of maintaining global peace and security. Id. at 424-26.
154. See William Sanders, “Multilateral Diplomacy,” XXI Bulletin, Dep’t of State, No. 526,
Aug. 8, 1949, at 163, 199, reprinted in Digest of International Law § 15, at 261 (1963) (stating
that sovereignty will not be a bar to the involvement of the international community when the
lives of citizens are at stake).
155. See Nagan, supra note 17, at 152 (describing the application of the Nuremberg decision
outside of the judicial realm).
156. See The Nuremberg Decision, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946) (setting forth the Tribunal’s
holding regarding sovereignty). The Tribunal stated in part that “[h]e who violates the laws of
war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state
in authorizing such action moves outside its competence under International Law.” Id.; see also
Robert H. Jackson, Final Report to the President of the United States on the Nuremberg Trials (Oct. 7,
1946), cited in ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE XVI-XV (1947) (declaring the
components of crimes deemed to be international). Justice Jackson stated that:
An agreement between the major powers for the first time made explicit and
unambiguous what was theretofore, as the Tribunal has declared, implicit in
International Law namely, that to prepare, incite, or wage a war of aggression . . . is a
crime against international society, and that to persecute, oppress, or do violence to
individuals or minorities on political, racial or religious grounds in connection with
such a war, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an
international crime . . . .
Id. as quoted in Nagan, supra note 17, at 152.
157. See Bodley, supra note 56, at 426 (stating that the United Nations was founded on the
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in the documents which provide the basis of international law and
158
Thus, the recognition of sovereignty seems to
human rights.
exclude any type of intervention by other member states.159
B. The Non-Intervention Principle: The Permissibility of Intervention In a
Sovereignty Minded International Society
Intervention is a necessary corollary to the principle of sovereignty
and is similarly enshrined in international law.160 The relationship
between the two concepts is extremely controversial given the often
conflicting mandates they present in the international arena. The
United Nations Charter itself provides the best example of the
glaring inconsistencies which pervade the international community
and prevent the effective enforcement of human rights laws through
intervention.
The purported goal of the United Nations to
encourage “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”161
conflicts with the actual sovereignty constraints placed on it by
162
member states in the name of maintaining international peace and
protecting territorial integrity.163 The protection of the principle of
sovereignty places the requirement that not only must member states
164
respect each other as sovereign equals, they must also refrain “in
principle of sovereignty); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (confirming that the
“[o]rganization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
158. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (providing that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”).
159. See Josh Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the
United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 889 (1992) (examining the role of sovereignty in the
permissibility of intervention by outside forces). Prohibition against intervention takes two
forms. Id. at 889-90. The first argues for a broad interpretation of sovereignty because of its
legal basis in international law. Id. Therefore, non-intervention, as it is analogous to the
independence of sovereign states, should be a rigid principle under international law. Id. at
890. The second argues that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention should be
restricted given the nature of the world today. Id. Because of growing state responsibility
towards its citizens, as recognized in the United Nations’ Charter and other international legal
documents, sovereignty and non-intervention must give way in the name of international peace
and security. Id.
160. See id. at 889 (describing the relationship between sovereignty and intervention).
161. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
162. See Elizabeth E. Ruddick, The Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: International Law,
International Protection, and the Internally Displaced, 77 B.U. L. REV. 429 (1997) (describing the
inconsistencies between the guarantees of sovereignty and the commitment to human rights).
163. See Philip Chase, Conflict in the Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic Conflict Under the
Contemporary Model of Sovereignty, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 219, 239 (commenting on the
importance of protecting sovereignty for the purpose of international peace and security); see
generally U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1 (conferring on the Security Council the responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security).
164. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
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their international relations from the threat or use of force against
165
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . .”
Therefore, the importance of sovereignty is reinforced by the United
Nations and has had a dampening effect on intervention.166 These
constraints have the effect of limiting international organizations and
member states in their attempts to enforce international human
rights laws through both forcible and non-forcible intervention.167
The consequences of this non-intervention policy were most
pronounced in the war in Yugoslavia.
C. How Sovereignty and the Principle of Non-Intervention Contributed to the
Devastation in the Yugoslav War
The brutality of the Yugoslav war has led some to question the
international law dictates, which hindered any effective intervention
by the international community to protect the rights of ethnic
minorities. In retrospect, the “international community . . . reacted
slowly, unwilling or unable to take action to end [the] violence that
168
has essentially consumed some nations.” To better understand the
hesitance by the international community to become involved in such
tragedies, which lead to its ineffectiveness in protecting human rights
as a whole, it is necessary to ascertain how the sovereignty and nonintervention principles affected the decisions of the international
players.
During the early stages of the crisis, the United Nations showed its
reluctance to become involved in the affairs of the Yugoslav state

165. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
166. In an attempt to further clarify the intervention principle and reinforce the notion of
sovereignty, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations. It states that “[n]o State or Group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State . . . .” Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970). See Chase,
supra note 163, at 240-41 (summarizing how the United Nations has dealt with intervention by
any means, including coercive economic and political measures).
167. See Chase, supra note 163, at 239-40 (examining the legal limits on various types of
intervention). Although the legal limitations on the use of force within a sovereign state are
well accepted in international law, other types of non-forcible intervention such as political and
economic measures are more controversial. Id. The lack of concrete international standards by
which member states and international organizations can operate in the context of non-forcible
intervention had led to inconsistencies in state responses to various conflicts. Id. See also
TOMISLAV MITROVIC, NON-INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES: PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 219 (M. Sahovic ed.,
1972) (detailing two theories regarding both forcible and non-forcible intervention).
168. Barnes, supra note 1, at 118.
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169

because of the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. The
human rights abuses in Yugoslavia, however, finally prompted action
on the part of the Security Council in 1992. The horrors of the
atrocities, such as the use of death camps, torture, and rape as tools
of war, which are prohibited by international law, commanded that
something be done. As such, in 1992, the Security Council drew
attention to the human rights abuses by passing a series of
Resolutions. The first, Security Council Resolution 713, imposed an
arms embargo on the warring parties in an attempt to eliminate the
tools of warfare.170 Security Council Resolution 764171 “drew particular
attention to obligations under international humanitarian law,
suggesting the possibility of individual responsibility for grave
violations.”172 The Security Council, concerned with the frequent
attacks on humanitarian convoys by Serb forces, adopted Resolution
173
770. This Resolution authorized governments to take “all necessary
measures” to ensure that relief aid would be safely delivered to
Bosnia. Security Council Resolution 771 obligated states to submit
their own reports detailing violations of human rights laws.174
On October 16, 1992, the Security Council, worried about the
alarming number of human rights violations and dismayed at its
inability to effectuate a reduction in the perpetuation of violence,
175
This Resolution expressed “its ‘grave
adopted Resolution 780.
alarm’ at the continuing reports of widespread violations of
international humanitarian law, including mass killings and the
abhorrent practice of ethnic cleansing . . . .”176 The Resolution
authorized the establishment of a Commission of Experts to
investigate violations of human rights and to submit those reports to
169. See AGE EKNES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS: THE UNITED NATIONS’
PREDICAMENT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 109 (Thomas G. Weiss ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers
1995) (analyzing how the non-intervention principle delayed the United Nations’ response to
the crisis).
170. See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 713] (banning the sale of arms to the parties engaged in the conflict).
171. See S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764 (1992)
(mandating that the warring parties comply with international human rights laws).
172. Nagan, supra note 17, at 154.
173. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3105th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992)
(authorizing member states to use the necessary means to effectuate the deliverance of
humanitarian aid).
174. See S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992)
(declaring that all parties to the conflict immediately cease their violations of human rights
laws).
175. See S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 780] (establishing the Commission of Experts).
176. Bodley, supra note 56, at 431.
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177
the Secretary-General. The report that was submitted pursuant to
Resolution 780 led the Security Council to conclude that ethnic
178
The policy of
cleansing had in fact taken place in Yugoslavia.
ethnic cleansing as carried out by the warring parties included
“murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial
executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of civilian
population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or
threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton
destruction of property.”179 More importantly, the Commission
concluded that such crimes constituted war crimes, crimes against
180
humanity, and genocide.
These findings led to Resolution 808, recommending the
establishment of an international tribunal for the “prosecution of
persons responsible for violation[s] of international humanitarian
181
law . . . .” This recommendation came to fruition with the passage
of Resolution 827 establishing an international tribunal to prosecute
the perpetrators who violated international humanitarian laws.182 The
Statute of the International Tribunal gives it the jurisdiction to
183
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949,

177. See S.C. Res. 780, supra note 175 (providing for the establishment of a Commission to
assess information already acquired by the Security Council and to investigate violations of
human rights laws).
178. See Bodley, supra note 56, at 432 (describing the Commission of Experts’ finding that
grave breaches of human rights laws had occurred in Yugoslavia).
179. Letter Dated February 9, 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, Annex I (Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)), U.N. Doc. S/25274, para. 55 (1993).
180. See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 28, 106 (1995) (commenting on the
conclusions of the Commission of Experts regarding the ethnic cleansing policies in
Yugoslavia); see also Bodley, supra note 56, at 433 (detailing the findings of the Commission of
Experts and their subsequent conclusions regarding ethnic cleansing).
181. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993) [hereinafter S.C Res. 808] (authorizing the formation of an international tribunal
under its Chapter VII powers).
182. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, art. 1
(1993) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 827] (adopting the Statute of the International Tribunal and
outlining the jurisdictional aspects).
183. See id. art. 2 (allowing for the prosecution of persons who have committed grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions). Article 2 describes the acts against persons or property
that constitute grave breaches. Id. These include:
willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive
destruction and appropriation of property . . .; compelling a prisoner of war a civilian
to serve in the forces of a hostile power; wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a
civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; unlawful deportation or transfer or
unlawful confinement of a civilian; taking civilians as hostages.
Id.
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184
185
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes
186
against humanity. The Statute also provides for individual criminal
responsibility of persons who, in any way, contributed to the
perpetration of crimes enumerated in the Statute.187
Despite its attempts to alleviate the suffering of the Yugoslav people
and to bring to justice the perpetrators of ethnic violence, the
international community failed to prevent the rising instances of
ethnic cleansing as the Security Council’s actions proved to be too
188
little, too late. Its outrage at the hostilities taking place persuaded
its members to pass the Resolutions aimed at averting further
189
These Resolutions, however, failed to achieve their
massacres.
purpose as the human rights violations continued unchecked.190 In
fact, the Security Council’s Resolutions were largely ineffective
because they failed to take any real action to bring an end to the
human rights abuses.191 Security Council Resolution 770, modeled on

184. See id. art. 3 (detailing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to prosecute individuals for
violations of the laws or customs of war). The violations include employing weapons calculated
to cause suffering; destruction of cities not militarily justified; attacks on undefended areas;
destruction of civilian institutions such as churches, schools, and historic monuments; and
plunder of property. Id.
185. See id. art. 4 (authorizing the prosecution of genocidal aggressors). This provision
utilizes the definition of genocide as codified in the Genocide Convention. Id. art. 4, para. 2(ae). Article 4 also designates certain acts as punishable including: “genocide; conspiracy to
commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit
genocide; and complicity in genocide.” Id. art. 4, para. 3(a-e).
186. See id. art. 5 (stating that the Tribunal has the authority to prosecute persons for crimes
against humanity in an armed conflict regardless of whether the conflict is international or
internal).
These crimes include “murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation;
imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; and other
inhumane acts.” Id.
187. See S.C. Res. 808, supra note 181, art. 7 (proclaiming the criminal liability of individual
persons including heads of state and subordinates).
188. See Sven Alkalaj, Essay, Never Again?, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 357, 358 (1999) (observing
that in Bosnia, over “200,000 people are dead or missing, over 220,000 people are wounded,
and over two million [are] displaced . . .”).
189. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1 and accompanying notes (detailing the Resolutions
passed by the Security Council).
190. See Cervoni, supra note 147, at 502 (discussing the inability of the Security Council to
put an end to the genocidal aggressions taking place in Yugoslavia).
191. See BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 33 (commenting on the general unwillingness of
the Security Council to take vigorous action). This unwillingness is highlighted in the various
Resolutions themselves including,
[A] one-sided arms embargo; . . . authorization [of] the use of military force which was
never implemented; . . . toothless economic sanctions that were so riddled with
loopholes as to be completely ineffective; . . . a “no-fly zone” which was violated over
four hundred times with impunity; . . . and [the creation of] “safe areas” which
became the sites of the conflict’s worst massacres.”
Id.; see also NEIER, supra note 2, at 112 (observing that the Security Council was hesitant to
become involved militarily and instead passed Resolutions to show that something was being
done to stop the massacres).
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Resolution 678 authorizing force against Iraq, did not have the same
192
There was no plan for military intervention,
effect in Bosnia.
despite the language in the Resolution allowing governments to use
force if necessary.193 The Resolutions, far from being a check on the
atrocities taking place, were seemingly inconsequential to the warring
parties, as some of the worst human rights abuses took place after the
passage of the Security Council Resolutions.194 In some instances, the
Resolutions only served to increase the hostilities that caused the
195
This then begs the
massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims.
question: why was the United Nations so reluctant to enforce its own
mandates?
The answer to this question is in the non-intervention principle.
Since the primary notion behind the creation of the United Nations’
Charter was non-intervention in the affairs of other states, the United
Nations has been reluctant to interfere in situations within the
borders of other states, regardless of the gross violations taking
place.196 The Charter provides for an exception to the principle
under its Chapter VII powers by stating that non-intervention “shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.”197 Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter endows the Security
Council with the ability to protect international peace and stability
198
when it is threatened. According to Article 39, the Security Council
may employ any means necessary, including armed force, when there
is a “threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression . . . .”199

192. See BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 33 (noting that Resolution 770, unlike its
predecessor 678, did not bring about the use of force to dispel enemy attacks).
193. See BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 33 (describing the reluctance of member states
to use force against Serbian aggression).
194. See U.N. Secretary-General, Eighth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia, 49th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/1994/967 (1994) (detailing the
continuation of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serb forces).
195. See Cervoni, supra note 147, at 499 (observing how the imposition of an arms embargo
left the Muslim people at the mercy of the better armed Croatian and Serbian forces). Security
Council Resolution 713 mandated an arms embargo to Yugoslavia, effectively eliminating
Bosnia’s ability to defend itself and its people. Id. at 500. See generally S.C. Res. 713, supra note
170, at paras. 3-6 (providing in part the implementation of a “general and complete embargo
on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia . . .”).
196. See Michael Bazyler, Symposium, Panel III-War Crimes and other Human Rights Abuses in
the Former Yugoslavia: The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention and the Case of Bosnia, 36 WHITTIER
L. REV. 433, 448 (1995) (discussing the non-intervention principle’s implicit bar against
humanitarian intervention).
197. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
198. See U.N. CHARTER ch. 7, art. 39 (authorizing the Security Council to take measures to
restore peace).
199. See TANCA, supra note 28, at 5 (discussing the Security Council’s ability to intervene
under its Chapter VII powers).
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This provision seems to allow intervention despite a state’s claims to
200
sovereignty even in situations which are of an internal matter, if the
Security Council finds that the controversy is not “essentially within
the jurisdiction” of the state and that it constitutes a “threat to
international peace and security.”201 This enforcement power under
Chapter VII is thus contingent on a finding that the conflict is
international, and because there is no provision allowing for
humanitarian assistance, most of the flagrant human rights abuses
are normally left unchecked.202
In this instance, however,
intervention under both the U.N. Charter and the various human
rights documents was not improper because Yugoslavia was a
signatory to the Charter, as well as numerous other human rights
documents.203 Despite this, the Security Council was reticent to use
intervention and instead passed Resolutions. These Resolutions were
mere rhetoric because they lacked any real resolve by the
international community to enforce them.204 As the U.N. commander
in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont stated in 1994,
“[t]here is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security
Council, the will to execute those resolutions, and the means
205
available to commanders in the field.”
This reticence to enforce its own mandates is rooted in the deeply
held beliefs regarding the non-intervention principle articulated in
Article 2(7) and the lack of provisions authorizing humanitarian
206
Because of the relatively new concept regarding
assistance.
humanitarian intervention, international law is largely silent on the
subject of whether human rights abuses are “essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction” of a state because of the relationship between a
207
government and its citizens. This may explain the reluctance of the
200. See TANCA, supra note 28, at 5 (interpreting the provision to stand for the proposition
that state sovereignty must be surrendered when international peace and security are at stake).
201. See Bazyler, supra note 196, at 449 (summarizing the exceptions to the non-intervention
principle).
202. See Bazyler, supra note 196, at 449 (examining the reasons why human rights violations
are “not a threat to ‘international peace and security’”).
203. See David M. Kresock, Note, “Ethnic Cleansing” in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of
Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 203, 219-20 (1994) (discussing Yugoslavia’s adoption
of various human rights treaties and the U.N. Charter which authorized intervention when
human rights are at issue).
204. See id. at 203 (analyzing the United Nations’ tolerance of human rights abuses as
evidenced by its reluctance to either intervene or enforce its own Resolutions because of
sovereignty concerns).
205. U.N. Bosnia Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993,
at A1.
206. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (affirming the non-intervention principle).
207. See Delbruck, supra note 159, at 892 (explaining the relationship between the Security
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United Nations and its member states to intervene even when grave
208
Member
breaches of human rights laws have been committed.
states are especially concerned with a formal right of humanitarian
intervention because they “fear the consequences to their own
survival should the focus of international law shift to individuals.”209
This fear became evident during the meetings of the Security
Council, where Russia and China refused to authorize military force
against the Serbs, who were committing gross atrocities, for fear that
such action would create a dangerous precedent for them.210 Instead,
the United Nations and its constituent member states felt that the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
was the appropriate forum to ensure that the violators of the
international human rights laws were brought to justice.211
The international community’s reliance on the ICTY as the means
212
for deterring and halting such egregious conduct has largely failed.
In fact, as of December 1999, only six individuals had been tried and
convicted, with the ring leaders of ethnic violence still at large.213 The
international community has thus far been reluctant to lend any real
support to the ICTY, rendering it virtually useless in apprehending
even those participants in ethnic cleansing who have been indicted.214
Council’s Chapter VII powers and the non-intervention principles outlined in Article 2(7)).
208. See Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice of Military Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An
Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 475, 481 (1995) (detailing the atrocities in Yugoslavia which were
broadcasted daily on various news programs); see also Splittgerber, supra note 87, at 200 (noting
that international law gives deference to states regarding human rights).
209. Mahalingam, supra note 144, at 224.
210. See Byron F. Burmester, Comment, On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World Order
and Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269, 320 (1994) (analyzing the reasons
behind the Security Council’s reluctance to use force). See generally David Wippman, Atrocities,
Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473 (1999) (discussing the
United Nations’ unwillingness to take military action in order to stop the conflict).
211. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 182 (expressing its hope that the Tribunal would ensure
that human rights violations “are halted and effectively addressed”).
212. See Wippman, supra note 210, at 476 (arguing that the risk of prosecution is so slight
that the potential political benefits gained by violating international human rights laws
outweighs it).
213. See Fact Sheet, International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (visited Dec. 30,
1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm/.
214. See Wippman, supra note 210, at 481 (noting how the lack of political and state support
will likely result in few prosecutions); see also Carol J. Williams, CRISIS IN YUGOSLAVIA, Wheels of
Justice Turn Slowly at Tribunal for War Crimes: U.N. Panel’s Record on Bringing Suspects to Trial
Suggests 5 Latest Indictees May Remain Free, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1999, at A20 (observing that thirtyfive indicted war criminals, including the senior officials, remain free); see also Walter Gary
Sharp, Sr., Symposium, International Obligations to Search for and Arrest War Criminals: Government
Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 411, 450-52 (1997) (analyzing the
reasons behind the international community’s reluctance to pursue indicted war criminals).
One of the main reasons behind the ICTY’s lack of progress in prosecuting war criminals is the
reluctance of the western world to disrupt the implementation of the Dayton Accords by
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This reluctance “again reflects the strength of the principles of
215
The failure of the ICTY to
sovereignty and non-intervention.”
prosecute those responsible for war crimes is not only a travesty of
justice for the victims of these atrocities, but has broader implications
for the future of international human rights laws and any deterrent
effect they may have on others.216
D. Geopolitical Timing and its Effects on Intervention and Enforcement of
Human Rights Laws
Concern over human rights led to the adoption of many human
rights instruments.217 Although many merely profess ideological
sentiments, the Genocide Convention and the Convention Against
Torture both provide for strict enforcement measures, enabling the
international community to force compliance with those laws.218 The
member states, however, failed to utilize those documents to bring an
end to the savagery of the war. The reason for this may be answered
by analyzing the geopolitical circumstances surrounding the war and
the effects this had on meaningful intervention in the conflict. At
any given period in time, certain events play a role in the actions and
policies of member states. Such geopolitical timing was a key factor
in the responses and involvement of the international actors in the
Yugoslav conflict and played a large role in its evolution from a crisis
to a disaster.
1. “This is the Hour of Europe:” The European Union and Its Initial
Response to the Yugoslav Crisis and the Reports of Human Rights
Violations
At the time the Yugoslav crisis began, Europe experienced
monumental changes with the Maastricht treaty and the reunification
of Germany as it sought to create a united European community.219
This geopolitical occurrence created a sense of euronationalism,
where the Europeans, assured by their newly acquired sense of
pursuing the arrest of Serb war criminals. Id.
215. McKeon, supra note 140, at 563.
216. See Wippman, supra note 210, at 481 (noting that the failure of the ICTY sends a mixed
message for others inclined to use ethnic cleansing as a means to an end).
217. See discussion supra Part II (detailing the various human rights documents).
218. See Procida, supra note 40, at 681 (commenting on the enforcement provisions of the
Genocide Convention which allow for intervention).
219. See SAMANTHA POWER, WITH NO PEACE TO KEEP—UN PEACEKEEPING AND THE WAR IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE RELUCTANT SUPERPOWER 149 (1999) (recounting the European
Union’s belief that it was the only power capable of restoring peace to Yugoslavia). Some of the
member countries to the European Union believed that Yugoslavia would provide the needed
incentive to create a common foreign and security policy. Id.
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foreign policy confidence, took the lead in attempting to deescalate
220
This European position proved an ill fated
the Yugoslav crisis.
mistake as the European Union’s preoccupation with its internal
operations left very little time and resources available for an effective
strategy regarding the Yugoslav crisis.221 In the beginning of the crisis,
the EU utilized both its diplomatic forces and economic incentives in
an attempt to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia.222 On the
diplomatic front, the European Union dispatched its Council of
223
Ministers to mediate the conflict. At the same time, the EU was also
using economic deterrence in the twin aims of keeping Croatia and
Slovenia from claiming independence and preventing the federal
government from using military force to enforce unity.224 It also
made economic aid contingent on the continued unity of Yugoslavia
and threatened denial of EU membership if the Yugoslav state
dissolved.225 Additionally, the European Union became involved in
monitoring cease-fires and human rights abuses.226 Despite these
efforts, by the spring of 1992 the world realized that the European
Union had failed miserably as the body count grew and the conflict
continued to escalate without any end in sight.227
The European Union failed in its attempts to prevent war in
Yugoslavia for several reasons.
First, its institutional egotism
contributed to its shortsightedness and blinded it to the fact that it
did not have the requisite tolls that would enable it to handle such a

220. See EKNES, supra note 169, at 109 (discussing the European Union’s control of the
Yugoslav situation during the early stages of the crisis).
221. See PHILIP TOWLE, MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS: THE BRITISH
DEBATE ABOUT INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 99 (Lawrence Freedman ed., Blackwell
Publishers 1994) (discussing Britain’s internal debate over intervention in Yugoslavia); see also
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS: AN INTRODUCTION 5
(Lawrence Freedman ed., Blackwell Publishers 1994) (analyzing the dichotomy between the
European Union’s perceived role as the preeminent force in European conflicts and the reality
of the European Union as a fledgling power). The European Union was unprepared for the
task of intervening in a crisis that had the potential of escalating into an ethnic war because of
its inability to create a security system capable of handling such conflicts. Id.
222. See GOW, supra note 136, at 16 (discussing the tools utilized by the European Union in
the Yugoslav crisis).
223. See GOW, supra note 136, at 16 (noting that the European Union sent mediators for the
purpose of ending the conflict).
224. See TOUVAL, supra note 109, at 406 (analyzing the tools utilized by the European Union
to prevent dissolutionment).
225. See LUND, supra note 110, at 61 (recounting the economic measures taken to ensure a
unified Yugoslav state).
226. See GOW, supra note 136, at 17 (describing the European Union’s operational role in
Yugoslavia).
227. See POWER, supra note 219, at 150 (observing that by the spring of 1992, Bosnia was
being decimated by the Serb and Croat forces).
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228
Rather than utilizing the Genocide Convention and the
conflict.
Convention against Torture, the European Union felt it could resolve
229
However, it
the war through diplomatic and economic means.
“sacrificed the interests of peace in the region to their own desire to
230
This failure is
forge a semblance of foreign policy competence.”
evident in the continued mishandling of the Yugoslav situation by the
Europeans from the beginning. Second, the European Union’s
attempts at diplomacy failed because its timing was wrong.
Diplomatic efforts were not undertaken until 1991 when ethnic
tensions were high and minor squirmishes had already erupted.231
Third, its use of economic deterrence proved useless and only
furthered the resolve of the secessionist leaders who used it to fuel
nationalistic tendencies.232
Fourth, the European Union was
inconsistent in its dealings with Yugoslavia by continually qualifying
its statements and failing to project clear goals and a unified stance
on the crisis.233 In fact, its actions may have contributed to the
continued atrocities in violation of the very international human
rights laws it purported to enforce. “The uncertainties that western
policies created led each of the contending Yugoslav parties to
believe that its actions would not be punished, but rather, that after a
brief interval of time, they would be accepted and perhaps supported
by the western governments.”234 The failure of the European Union
to enforce the laws announced in the Genocide Convention and the
Convention Against Torture can be attributed to its inability to
foresee the consequences inherent in its actions and the geopolitical
235
circumstances surrounding the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

228. See JANE M. O. SHARP, MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS: APPEASEMENT,
INTERVENTION AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 47 (Lawrence Freedman ed., Blackwell Publishers
1994) (discussing the extreme incompetence of the European Union in the Yugoslav crisis).
229. See id. at 49 (commenting on the “inept diplomacy” of the European Union).
230. Id.
231. See GOW, supra note 136, at 22 (concluding that by the time the European Union sent
mediators, there was no hope of reintegrating Slovenia and Croatia). The most disturbing
aspect of this delay was that there had been reports of potential problems in the region from as
far back as 1980 and especially with the walkout of the Yugoslav Congress in 1989. Id.
232. See TOUVAL, supra note 109, at 407 (examining the sentiments of the Yugoslav people at
the time when economic inducements were offered). In situations where ethnic tensions are
high, the economic stability of a state is not a priority to its citizens. Id.
233. See GOW, supra note 136, at 22 (stating that the actions of the European Union were
ineffective because of its inability to portray a clear stance on the conflict).
234. TOUVAL, supra note 109, at 407; see DENITCH, supra note 103, at 7 (“Thus, all those who
support the creation of ethnic or national states, instead of states that will embrace all their
citizens, support, consciously or unconsciously, policies of ethnic cleansing.”).
235. See GOW, supra note 136, at 24 (examining the reasons behind the failure of the
European Union to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia).
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2. “We Are Not the World’s Policeman” — the United States’ Reluctance to
Involve Itself in the Yugoslav Conflict
America’s hesitance to enforce the provisions of international
236
human rights laws was evident in Yugoslavia.
Concern over the
breakup of the Soviet Union and the recent debacle in Somalia
caused the United States’ reluctance to become involved in an
237
uncertain situation. As such, the United States felt that the United
Nations and the European Union would project its sentiments that it
would not allow the policies of ethnic cleansing to take place in
238
Yugoslavia.
The United States assumed that the European Union
and the United Nations were capable of bringing peace to the region
239
a sentiment consistent with
through whatever means necessary,
United States’ foreign policy that it will not continue to be the
world’s policeman.
President Clinton reiterated this position
throughout the conflict and in his address to the United Nations in
1999, where he reaffirmed that “some are troubled that the United
States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe
240
in the world.
We cannot do everything, everywhere . . . .”
America’s reticence regarding intervention in the burgeoning crisis
through enforcement of human rights laws may also be explained by
examining its position regarding the Genocide Convention and other
human rights laws.
The United States has historically been unenthusiastic about
human rights laws and treaties. Its concerns derive both from the
feeling that the U.S. Constitution affords adequate protection of
241
human rights, and from sovereignty concerns. “Treaties on human
236. See POWER, supra note 219, at 149 (noting that the United States was content to allow
the European Union to take charge of the situation in Yugoslavia).
237. See POWER, supra note 219, at 149 (examining the reasoning behind the United States’
reluctance to become involved in Yugoslavia).
238. See THOMAS HALVERSON, MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTSDISENGAGEMENT BY STEALTH: THE EMERGING GAP BETWEEN AMERICA’S RHETORIC AND THE
REALITY OF FUTURE EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 90 (Lawrence Freedman ed., Blackwell Publishers
1994) (discussing America’s involvement at the initial stages of the Yugoslav conflict). The
“U.S. government saw no reason why it should intervene and pay disproportionately to protect
these principles when they seemed logically more salient in this case to her European allies.”
Id. at 91.
239. See id. (observing the United States’ position regarding involvement in the Yugoslav
crisis by the United Nations and European Union).
240. Colum Lynch, U.N. Should Understand Its Limits, Clinton Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 22,
1999, at A25. Clinton reiterated this position by stating that the United States “need not
respond by [itself] to each and every outrage of violence.” HALVERSON, supra note 238, at 84.
241. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Article, Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to
CEDAW: Should the Constitution be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727,
727 (1996) (examining the prevalent feelings of the United States towards its Constitution).
The Constitution is often used as an excuse to override certain provisions in human rights
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rights are likely to jeopardize the sovereignty of state parties without,
at the same time, offering them a commercial advantage that may
242
The refusal of
render a compromise of sovereignty worthwhile.”
the United States to ratify treaties, or to ratify them with a staggering
number of reservations designed to protect its interests, commonly
occurs.243 Historically, human rights treaties are ill received in the
U.S. Senate, whose members often argue that the ratification of such
244
instruments would jeopardize the Constitution. This opposition to
human rights treaties is most evident in the ratification debate over
the Genocide Convention, which was signed by President Truman
and only recently ratified in 1988.245 Hence, the United States’ refusal
to utilize these human rights laws as enforcement mechanisms
against the perpetrators of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia is not
surprising.246
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The tragedy in Yugoslavia should have been avoided. The
numerous human rights laws promulgated after the atrocities of
World War II sent a message to states that such abuses would not be
tolerated by the international community. Their provisions provided
adequate enforcement mechanisms for the purpose of deterring the
kind of systematic violence witnessed during the Holocaust. Nations
such as Yugoslavia, however, refuse to abide by the dictates of these
treaties. Id. This includes provisions which provide better protection than the Constitution
affords. Id.
242. Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 643, 650 n.30 (1990).
243. See id. (noting that reservations often reassure signatories that their interests will be
protected).
244. See Mayer, supra note 241, at 749 (commenting on the rhetoric used by opponents to
human rights laws to garner public support for their position). This rhetoric includes
statements such as “Covenant on Human Slavery,” “legal basis for the most repressive measures
of atheistic tyranny,” and an “attempt to repeal the Bill of Rights.” Id. (describing Senator
Bricker’s opposition to the ratification of the International Covenants). See also NATALIE
HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 1, 136 (1990) (detailing the findings of her study on the Senate’s attitudes towards human rights
laws).
245. See Mayer, supra note 241, at 749-50 (commenting on the reluctance of the Senate to
ratify even those treaties which purport to codify basic human rights).
246. See Mayer, supra note 241, at 755 (observing that the numerous reservations and
prolonged ratification process lends doubt to the obligations of the United States); see also M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Symposium, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights by the U.States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1179-80 (1993) (noting that
United States ratification of human rights laws creates uncertainties in the international
community). “The Senate’s practice of de facto rewriting treaties, through reservations,
declarations, understandings, and provisos, leaves the international credibility of the United
States shaken and its reliability as a treaty-negotiating partner with foreign countries in doubt.”
Id. at 1173.
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laws with impunity, confident that their actions would not suffer the
consequences of such violations because of the lack of will to enforce
them. This persistent feeling led to the tragic death of thousands of
innocent human beings as the world watched. In order to ensure
that such flagrant human rights abuses will not be tolerated, this
Comment attempts to provide recommendations designed to prevent
such instances from occurring.
The states themselves present some of the most prevalent problems
with effective enforcement of human rights laws. Human rights laws
depend on the will of the states to enforce their provisions through
247
The provisions regarding
both accommodation and coercion.
human rights lose their potency in the bureaucratic melee of
domestic concerns and sovereignty interests because they rely on
states to force compliance with the dictates of international law.
Because the international system is state based, the burden of
ensuring that states comply with their international obligations is
necessarily placed on the citizens.248 The promotion of human rights
must be internalized into domestic legal systems in order for states to
249
fulfill their international obligations. Only then can we begin to see
a change in the way the international community, comprised of states
themselves, responds to acts of aggression that violate not only
human rights laws, but our own sense of morality and decency.
The dichotomy between protecting human rights and respect for
sovereignty presents another problem inherent in enforcing
compliance with human rights. In the context of modern day society,
“the human rights values embraced by the international
250
community” necessarily limits the notion of sovereignty. As such,
sovereignty should not be a bar to enforcement of the international
human rights laws that the world as a whole embraces.251 The U.N.
Charter has adequate provisions designed to limit states from
encroaching on the sovereignty of others and allows for the breach of
sovereignty only in extreme situations.252 Thus, the limitations placed
247. See Koh, supra note 138, at 1408-09 (discussing the “horizontal” approach of
international human rights law enforcement which is predicated on the pressure states put on
each other to comply with certain norms).
248. See Koh, supra note 138, at 1416 (observing the state centered notion behind
international law).
249. See Koh, supra note 138, at 1416 (describing the obligations of citizens to force their
states to comply with international legal doctrines).
250. S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights
Claims, 75 IOWA L. REV. 837, 843 (1990).
251. See id. (analyzing how sovereignty concerns are superceded by the human rights values
member states share).
252. See id. (detailing those provisions of the U.N. Charter which limit the encroachment on
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on member states by international human rights laws are not an
abandonment of sovereignty, but merely a means for “preserving the
253
world we live in for present and future generations . . . .” States that
abide by their international obligations in their actions towards their
citizens have no reason to fear a violation of their rights as sovereign
nations.254 Instead, by enforcing compliance with international
human rights laws, they are reinforcing their status as a sovereign
255
nation and ensuring international peace and security.
A general lack of will as shown by member states hinders the
enforcement of human rights laws.256 A related problem includes the
lack of tools necessary to compel compliance with human rights
norms.257 Numerous legal scholars have propounded the theory that
the establishment of a permanent international court would stifle
such acts of violence and promote conformity with human rights
laws.258 An effective tool in combating instances of ethnic violence
entails the creation of an international criminal court, but only if
other changes are instituted giving the international court the ability
to efficaciously do its job. These changes include a consensus by the
member states to agree to the jurisdiction of the court in prosecuting
human rights violations, domestic legislation submitting member
states to the jurisdiction of the court, and the apprehension and
deportment of individuals indicted by the court. In theory, such a
court would be an effective deterrent to future violations of human
rights principles by employing a universal jus cogens approach to
prosecution.
In reality, the establishment of a permanent court may not be
effective in bringing perpetrators of ethnic violence to justice for
a state’s sovereignty).
253. van der Vyver, supra note 141, at 443.
254. See Mahalingam, supra note 144, at 262 (observing that intervention only allows the
international community to deal with violators while “respecting the sovereignty of those who
abide by basic standards”).
255. See Mahalingam, supra note 144, at 262 (noting that there is a balance between
sovereignty concerns and human rights concerns).
256. See discussion supra Part IV.D and accompanying notes (describing the general lack of
will on the part of member states to enforce human rights laws).
257. See Yoram Dinstein, Panel, Human Rights: Implementation Through the UN System, 89 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 225, 243 (“The greatest problem faced by the UN system for the
protection of human rights is the inadequate availability of tools to ensure implementation of
binding norms.”).
258. See Cervoni, supra note 147, at 527-33 (arguing for the implementation of a permanent
International Criminal Court). The Tribunal in Yugoslavia was created by the United Nations,
and its effectiveness is therefore hampered by existing United Nations conventions, which limit
its jurisdictional reach. Id. at 527. An International Criminal Court would be able to bypass the
current limitations of the present system by creating a universal jurisdictional system to reach all
perpetrators of war crimes, regardless of state involvement. Id. at 529.
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several reasons. First, states may be unwilling to submit to the
jurisdiction of such a court because of a lack of consensus as to an
259
Second, the sovereignty concerns of
international criminal code.
states may be a bar to the adoption of a permanent court.260 The
current state of affairs suggests that the establishment of a permanent
international court is merely a theoretical suggestion rather than a
concrete proposal given the international community’s unwillingness
261
to seriously entertain the possibility.
In order to prevent another tragic occurrence of ethnic violence
that was witnessed in Yugoslavia, the United Nations represents the
best hope to human kind. The United Nations is replete with the
authority to intervene when “international peace and security” are
threatened and play a pivotal role in monitoring potential conflicts.262
As a preventive institution, the United Nations has the authority to
intervene diplomatically under its Chapter VI263 powers by sending
mediators to facilitate discourse between parties before violence
264
occurs. If mediation fails, the Security Council Chapter VII powers
authorizes the use of force. Because international peace and security
must be threatened before the Security Council can act pursuant to
Chapter VII, genocide and crimes against humanity must be
redefined. As it stands now, such acts utilized by governments and
their agents against their own populations are not deemed to
threaten international peace and security because they occur within a
state’s sovereign territory.265 Until the global community realizes that
these crimes, regardless of the territorial boundaries where they
occur, threaten the world as a whole, such horrific acts will continue
to pervade the international arena. Once this realization occurs,
259. See Cervoni, supra note 147, at 532 (analyzing the problems inherent in the creation of
an international criminal court).
260. See Cervoni, supra note 147, at 533 (noting the sovereignty concerns of states if a
permanent court were established).
261. See Cervoni, supra note 147, at 533 (observing the reluctance of states to create an
international criminal court).
262. See Steven R. Ratner, Theme Panel II: The Rise of Nationalism and the Breakup of States:
Controlling the Breakup of States: Toward a United Nations Role, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 33, 44
(1994) (noting that one of the main functions of the United Nations is monitoring potential
“hot spots” which threaten international peace and security and violate human rights laws).
263. See U.N. CHARTER ch. VI, art. 33 (mandating that the parties to a dispute shall
negotiate a peaceful settlement and authorizing the Security Council to take appropriate action
when the dispute threatens international peace and security).
264. See Ratner, supra note 262, at 44 (discussing the critical preventive and diplomatic role
of the United Nations); see generally BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 1 (1995)
(discussing the future role of the United Nations in the areas of preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking, and peacekeeping).
265. See Barnes, supra note 1, at 144-45 (noting that the U.N. Charter is ineffective when
faced with internal ethnic conflicts).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss3/4

40

Waller: Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and International Law: How the Rise o
WALLER.FINAL.ASC

10/7/01 7:37 PM

2001]INTRASTATE ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

661

then the Security Council can utilize its enforcement powers to stop
the horrifying effects of ethnic cleansing.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment analyzed both the tragedy of the Yugoslav conflict
and the human rights laws designed to prevent it. The rise of
intrastate ethnic conflicts has emphasized the deficiencies in our
current international human rights system, namely the unwillingness
266
of the international community to enforce its provisions. Until the
international community deems violations of human rights laws as
potential threats to global peace and security, we are destined to
relive the consequences of ethnic violence despite our protestations
of “never again.”

266. See Alkalaj, supra note 188, at 358-59 (describing the hesitance of the international
community to apply human rights principles).
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